# 9435.T — Hikari Tsushin, Inc
## The question
What would have to be true for 9435.T to be worth more than ¥37,340?
Only this: the sales business is worth more than 7.5× its after-tax operating profit. At ¥37,340 the market pays ¥1,634bn. The portfolio, net of all debt and the tax on its gains, is ¥953bn of that. So the market pays ¥680bn for a sales business that is guided to ¥130bn of operating profit this year.
## What the data says
- Sector: Industrials / Conglomerates. It is two businesses: a sales organisation (telecoms, electricity, water, insurance and consumer loans) and a portfolio of stakes in listed companies.
- Price when this page was written: ¥37,340. Shares outside treasury: 43.75m. Market value: ¥1,634bn.
- Portfolio at 30 June 2026, including the 40 listed companies held at 20% or more, valued at market:
- Market value: ¥1,506.7bn, which is 92% of Hikari's own market value.
- Cost: ¥889.9bn. Gain before tax: ¥617.6bn.
- Hikari's "net cash assets" are cash, less all debt, plus listed securities and bonds: ¥1,142.3bn. After about 30.6% tax on the gain, that is ¥953bn, or ¥21,786 a share. The balance sheet carries ¥206.7bn of deferred tax.
- Hikari's share of the operating profit of the companies it holds is ¥152.2bn over the last 12 months. That is a 10.1% yield on the portfolio's market value and 17.1% on its cost. Hikari states a pre-tax return of 18% a year over the last 9 years.
- Sales business: operating profit grew from ¥83.5bn to ¥116.6bn between FY3/22 and FY3/26, about 9% a year. FY3/27 guidance: revenue ¥775bn (+5.5%), operating profit ¥130bn (+11.4%).
- The P/E misleads in both directions. Under IFRS, the gains on most holdings go to other comprehensive income, not profit. Q1 comprehensive income was ¥78.8bn against profit of ¥36.7bn. The 22% fall in profit that analysts expect for this year is a reporting effect, not a business that is shrinking.
- The dividend has risen for 16 years in a row. The forecast is ¥800 a share for FY3/27.
- In the app: the Kiyohara screen passes the hard filters but scores only 39 of 100. It fails the acquisition-compounder screen on revenue growth, ROIC and cash conversion, and it is too large for Yartseva. The comps return no peers. The DCF is not used here (see below).
## The four drivers
The intrinsic-value model is the wrong shape for this company: it would read the portfolio as capital the sales business needs to grow. The value below is the sum of the parts. The DCF figures are kept only for comparison.
- Revenue growth: 5.5% (FY3/27 guidance)
- Target operating margin: 16.8% (operating profit ¥130bn over revenue ¥775bn)
- Sales to capital: not used. Book capital includes the portfolio, which makes growth look very expensive.
- Cost of capital: the app gives 6.1%, but that uses US rates. It should be lower for a Japanese company.
| Case | Sales business at (× after-tax operating profit of ¥90bn) | ¥ a share | Against ¥37,340 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Floor | 8× | 38,279 | +2.5% |
| **Base** | **12×** | **46,525** | **+24.6%** |
| High | 16× | 54,771 | +46.7% |
| Bear | 8×, and the portfolio falls 25% | 32,305 | −13.5% |
Margin of safety at the base case: **20%**.
## Where I could be wrong
- **Debt.** There is ¥1.1tn of debt against the portfolio. A 25% fall in the portfolio takes about ¥260bn off after tax, about 16% of the market value.
- **Selling the stakes.** The 20–43% stakes in thinly traded small companies cannot be sold at the screen price. A holding-company discount is not included above.
- **The net-cash-assets figure is Hikari's own.** I could not reconcile it fully from the balance sheet: about ¥310bn of listed securities and bonds sits outside the ¥1,506.7bn portfolio figure.
- **The sales business.** It earns on customers it signs up. Its acquisition costs are capitalised (¥60.8bn of contract costs), and a change in a market it depends on, such as electricity, can reverse quickly.
- **The figures are from June.** The Q2 results are due on 2026-11-11.
## The decision
- Call:
- Size:
- Review on: the Q2 FY3/27 results (due 2026-11-11). Update the net cash assets and the portfolio market value.
Sources: [Hikari pure-investment page](https://www.hikari.co.jp/net_investment/), [Q1 FY3/27 presentation](https://www.hikari.co.jp/assets/pdf/ir/40th/1st_presen.pdf), [Q1 FY3/27 statement](https://www.hikari.co.jp/assets/pdf/ir/40th/1st_zaimu.pdf), and the Raging Capital Ventures interview.
## Related notes
- [[Technical Moat Assessment Framework]]
- [[First Principles and Mental Models MoC]]
- [[Maps of Content (MOCs)]]
- [[Investing System MoC]]
- [[Compounder Screen - August 2026]]
- [[Investing Principles]]
- [[Quality Compounders]]
- [[Investment Thesis Structure]]