# Tails A portable operating system that runs from a USB stick. It leaves no trace and sends all traffic through [[Tor]].^[https://tails.net/about/index.en.html] - You shut down the computer and start it from the Tails stick instead of Windows, macOS or Linux. - Made by the Tor Project, a global nonprofit. Free and open source. Built on Debian and GNOME. - Funded by donations, Mozilla, DuckDuckGo, Open Tech Fund and Craig Newmark Philanthropies. ## Problems it solves - **Surveillance.** Tor stops a watcher on your connection from seeing what you do. - **Censorship.** Bridges hide that you connect to Tor at all. - **Tracking.** Trackers and advertisers cannot follow you from site to site. - **Forensic traces.** A normal OS keeps sites, files, passwords and Wi-Fi networks. Tails never writes to the hard disk. It runs only in memory. - **Persistent malware.** Every boot starts from the same clean state. What you do disappears at shutdown. - **Leaky files.** Metadata Cleaner strips metadata before you share a file. ## What is inside - Tor Browser with uBlock. All apps go through Tor, including software you add. - Optional Persistent Storage on the stick. It is encrypted automatically. - Thunderbird for encrypted email. GNOME Secrets for passwords. OnionShare for file sharing. LibreOffice. - Needs an 8 GB USB stick and about 30 minutes to install. ## Why use it - Use one computer that you do not trust, without leaving yourself on it. - Separate identities. Restart between work email and a sensitive inbox. Use one stick per activity. - Journalism, activism, whistleblowing, or any research you do not want tied to you. ## Why it matters now - [[Deception x Detection]]: deception gets cheaper and faster. Detection lags. - Every trace you leave is raw material for a convincing fake: a phishing email, a cloned voice, a targeted lie. - When you cannot reliably detect the fake, cut the supply. Leave less data to harvest. - Tails makes "leave nothing" the default, not a discipline you must remember. - Same idea as [[Framework Computer]]: the user, not the vendor, controls the machine. > [!warning] Safe, not magic > - Sites and ISPs can see that you use Tor. Many sites block Tor. > - Tor exit nodes can read traffic that is not encrypted end to end. > - An adversary who watches both ends of a circuit could unmask you. No such attack is known in practice. > - It does not protect against hardware keyloggers or compromised firmware. > - Identity leaks through behaviour: mixed sessions, file metadata, logging in to personal accounts. > ^[https://tails.net/doc/about/warnings/index.en.html] ---- tags: #boat #security links: [[Security MoC]] [[Deception x Detection]] [[Tor]] [[Framework Computer]]